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Para-states as an instrument for strengthening Russia's
position - the case of Transnistria
Abstract
The aim of the article is to analyze and characterize the use of cooperation with the
unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic by the Russian Federation to strengthen
its position in the competition for power with the states of the euoratlantic space. During
the initiated research, research methods and techniques characteristic of qualitative
research were used, e.g. analysis of documents and statements of leading political decisionmakers from Russia and Transnistria. The results of the research unequivocally show that
strengthening the statehood of the parastatal state is one of the instruments of the Russian
Federation, thanks to which it pursues its strategic goal - maintaining the position of a
hegemon in the post-Soviet area, which strengthens its adaptability in strategic
competition with the West for power. The functioning of the pro-Russian Transnistria in the
composition of Moldova enables Russia to influence the policy of this country, exerting
pressure and preventing it from dynamising the process of integration with Euro-Atlantic
structures (primarily with the European Union), while retaining it in its traditional sphere
of influence.
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Introduction
A non-recognized state (interchangeable terms: Para-state, quasi-state)
is a political entity possessing all the attributes of statehood (for
example political system, armed forces, foreign policy), but it does not
have international recognition of statehood status.1 Formally, it is a
part of another state. A non-recognized State is an entity where a
separatist center of power controls the territory concerned on the path
of armed conflict, but is not strong enough to force recognition of the
territory's independence from the home State.2 The collapse of the
Soviet Union implied the creation of many such entities within the
post-Soviet area, e.g. the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh),
Abkhazia or the Pridnestrovian Republic of Moldova. Russia is often
the patron of strengthening the statehood of para-states. The aim of the
article is to analyze the use of cooperation with countries not
recognized by the Russian Federation to strengthen its geopolitical
position in competition with the West on the example of Russian
influence in Transnistria.
The thesis of the article is as follows: Supporting separatist tendencies
in Transnistria is one of the elements enabling Russia to maintain its
position as a hegemon in the post-Soviet area, which affects its position
in the global competition for power. In order to characterize this issue
adequately, it is necessary to answer the following research questions:
How does the Russian Federation Strengthen the Statehood of the
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic? What are the strategic benefits for
Russia of cooperation with Transnistria?
The author's motivation for the research is the topicality of the subject
matter and its priority for the security of not only Moldova, but also of
the whole Europe. The ongoing war in the east of Ukraine (2014- ) is
the best example of the fact that the functioning of parastatal states and
Russian support for them is a challenge for the entire international
community. Author used a various research tools including analysis of
documents and statements of leading political decision-makers of the
Russian Federation and Transnistria. The events of the second decade
of the 21st century have priority.
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Historical Background to the Pridnestrovian Moldavian
Republic Uprisings
Transnistria (the official name of the unrecognized state:
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) is a region of Moldova located on
the left bank of the Dniester River and includes the right-bank town of
Bender with its surrounding villages. According to the latest census
conducted by the authorities in Tiraspol in 2015 (Tiraspol is the capital
of the parastatal state), the territory of Transnistria is inhabited by
476,000 people. What is characteristic, the majority of the population
is Slavic (29.1 percent - Russians and 22.9 percent Ukrainians).3
Notably, the Moldovans living in the area (28.6 percent of the
population) are strongly pro-Russian and have a Russian (Soviet)
identity.4 Transnistria is the only region in the world where citizens
write the Moldovan language in the Cyrillic alphabet, but from the
perspective of the whole society it must be said that Russian is the
dominant language in administration and daily communication.5 This
identity identification, completely different from the rest of Moldova, is
a result of the history of the region. Slavic civilization strongly
influenced Transnistria in the 5th century as part of the extensive
colonization of Slavs from the Don River to the Elbe River. As early as
the 8th and 9th centuries, the Slavs became the dominant force in the
Transnistrian region. Until the middle of the 10th century, the Slavs
resisted attempts to include this territory in Kievan Ruthenia, but in
the end, most of Transnistria managed to submit to the prince
Svyatoslav Igorevich. However, the rule of Kiev did not last long,
because already in the 11th century the area was under the rule of
nomadic tribes, while the Mongols conquered the whole Kievan Rus in
the 13th century.6 Despite the brief influence of Russia on the
Transnistrian lands, one of the arguments accentuated by the elite of
Tiraspol that Transnistria is an extreme area of the Russian World and
its inhabitants have a Russian identity.7
The international community treats Transnistria as an integral part of
Moldova. It has in fact functioned as an independent entity towards the
political center in Chisinau since the early 1990s, including foreign
policymaking, its central bank (and its own currency, the Transnistrian
ruble) and political system. The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic is a
result of the Transnistrian-Russian War (1992), which ended in the
success of separatist troops. Moldova begun the process of military
suppression of separatist sentiments in the rebellious region, which,
after the Republic of Moldova regained sovereignty, expressed the
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desire to separate from the country and build a separate state. Chisinau
has encountered strong resistance to the mobilized potential of
Transnistria, supported by voluntary forces from other post-Soviet
states that have defended Transnistria's membership of the Russian
World.8 Particularly important points in the planning activities of
Moldovan strategists were Dubossary cities (due to the proximity of the
largest hydroelectric power plant) and Bender on the right bank of the
border, which were a shield for the capital of the paraphernalia, in
other words Tiraspol. Not without significance was the significant
support of the Russian Federation in the course of military operations.
Russian (formerly Soviet) troops of the 14th Army stationed near the
city of Bender, which were directly involved on the side of Transnistria.
This was a key event that helped to break the siege of the city, which
had lasted since April 1992, as part of the Moldovan operation “Trojan
Horse.” In June 1992, the merged Russian and Transnistrian troops
finally succeeded in clearing the city of the Moldovan armed
formations.9
Due to the change in the strategic situation to the detriment of
Moldova, political decision-makers decided to initiate peace talks. In
the end, both sides accepted a peace agreement 21 July 1992. The
document signed by the Presidents of Moldova (Mircea Snegur) and
the Russian Federation (Boris Yeltsin) indicates the desire to seek a
peaceful solution to the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region,
confirming compliance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter and the Conference on Security, and Cooperation in Europe.
The parties to the conflict are obliged to take steps towards a ceasefire
and any armed action against each other, to remove military
equipment, weapons and military units within 7 days so that a security
zone can be established between them. Under Article 2 of the
Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed
Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova, a
Control Commission consisting of representatives of the three parties
(Moldova, Russia, and Transnistria) had to maintain security in the
zone. In addition, the Commission was to monitor the implementation
of the ceasefire measures. The city of Bender became its seat. The
parties have declared the secondment of military contingents in charge
of peacekeeping in the zone in accordance with the decisions taken by
the Commission.10 Since then, a process of unsuccessful peace
negotiations for a final settlement of the breakaway status of
Transnistria has begun, which is still ongoing today. From that moment
on, the process of fruitless peace negotiations, which are still ongoing
3
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today, began, leading to the final settlement of the separatist status of
Transnistria. At the same time, the process of consolidating the
statehood of Transnistria is progressing, which would not be so
dynamic if Tiraspol did not have such multifaceted support from the
Russian Federation.11

Influence of the Russian Federation on Strengthening the
Statehood of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and
Independence from Moldova
Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Transnistria is
multifaceted. Strengthening bilateral relations is a strategic objective of
the authorities in Tiraspol. Both political decision-makers and the
people of the region see good relations with Russia as a guarantee of
the existence of the parastatal state in its present form and as a factor
strengthening the welfare of the society. The intensively developed
bilateral relations relate primarily to the areas of military, economic,
and social cooperation, as well as political and diplomatic cooperation.
In the case of the military dimension of cooperation between Tiraspol
and Moscow, it is worth stressing the presence of Russian armed forces
in Transnistria. The mission, which aims to maintain peace in the
territory of the rebellious region, consists of 402 soldiers, stationed in
the area of 15 most important checkpoints along the Dniester River.12
The already mentioned 1992 peace agreement set out their
responsibilities. Moreover, Russia's military support for Transnistria
manifests itself in the stationing in Tiraspol of the so-called Russian
Military Operational Group in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic
of Moldova (Rus. Operativnaya gruppa rossiyskikh voysk v
Pridnestrovskom regione Respubliki Moldova), which was created as a
result of the transformation of the Russian forces of the 14th Army in
1995. The estimated size of these military personnel is about 1200
soldiers.13 The aim of cooperation of this formation in the territory of
the parastatal state is to secure post-Soviet weapon storage sites
(mainly a large warehouse of weapons and ammunition in the village of
Kolbasna) and to respond to the symptoms of instability in the region.
Notably, the Operational Group is not a mechanism established based
on the peace agreement ending the Moldovan-Transnistrian war, as
Moldovan decision-makers have repeatedly stressed. In the eyes of
Moldovan decision-makers, the presence of this formation undermines
Moldova's constitutional provisions, its sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and the fundamental norms of international law.14
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The Tiraspol administration, on the other hand, is signaling the high
level of effectiveness of the current form of the peacekeeping mission,
as evidenced by the lack of armed clashes in a separate security area
since the establishment of the forces. Moreover, it is a disincentive for
the Republic of Moldova to try again to pacify the separatist sentiments
in Transnistria militarily. When assessing the Russian military
potential operating in the parastatal area (mainly battalions of
motorized riflemen), it is worth noting that it is large enough to
adequately secure the most important points of the region, such as the
capital and the right-bank Bender. This is possible with coordinated
cooperation with the potential of Transnistria (the parastatal armed
forces are about 7,500 soldiers). In the strategic dimension, the
neighborhood of Transnistria with Ukraine is important. Concentration
of potential on the Moldovan (Transnistrian)-Ukrainian border could
contribute to destabilization of the southern part of Ukraine, in other
words the Odessa region (although these forces would not be able to
resist joint actions of Moldovan-Ukrainian forces effectively).
Consequently, the Russian armed forces in the Transnistrian region are
not only a direct threat to Moldova's security, but also a challenge to
regional security.
As far as the economic and social sphere of support for the PMR
(Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) provided by Russia is concerned,
it is worth mentioning a few aspects of it. The way the region's economy
functions is important for the proper interpretation of bilateral
cooperation between these entities. Due to the small internal market,
Tiraspol focuses primarily on exports of its goods to foreign markets.
Moscow is a key trading partner for Tiraspol. According to 2018 data
from the State Customs Committee of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian
Republic, relations with Russia account for 29 percent of total trade in
Transnistria. In addition, Transnistrian exports to the Russian market
have increased by 34 percent compared to 2017. Transnistria exports to
the Russian Federation mainly chemical products, vegetables (fresh
and frozen), clothing, and engineering products.15 In addition to
intensive trade between entities, it is worth stressing the importance of
the Russian labor market, which generates significant revenues for the
Transnistrian budget. The majority of paraphernalia's inhabitants who
decide to work abroad are now going to Russia. An example illustrating
the importance of this important issue is data from the Transnistrian
Republican Bank. The only in the period from January to March 2019;
the volume of private money transfers transferred via electronic
5
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systems amounted to over $22 million. As much as 62.9 percent (in
other words about $5 million) of this amount were money transfers
from persons residing in Russia.16
Targeted subsidies and gas subsidies are an extremely important
manifestation of the Russian Federation's financial support for
strengthening the state of Transnistria.17 Russian direct subsidies
strengthen a number of aspects of the parastatal state's social security.
For social security, since 2008 the Russian Federation pays out
allowances for the pensions of quasi-state residents. In addition, it also
supports health care (financing the modernization of hospital wards,
purchase of modern equipment) and education (financing the
construction, and renovation of schools and kindergartens, printing
textbooks).18 In this context, the organization of the Eurasian Initiative
in Moscow (Rus. Avtonomnaya Nekommercheskaya Organizatsiya
'yevraziyskaya integratsiya'), which provides a platform for material aid
to Transnistria, is important. The organization started its activity in
2012 and thanks to Russian funds; it was possible to implement many
social projects in the parastatal area, including the construction of
schools and kindergartens (e.g. the construction of kindergarten no. 6
in the Rybnica area).19 It is worth remembering that the abovementioned organization and the "Eurasian Transnistria" project are
part of the Russian Federation's propaganda tools for strengthening the
image of Transnistria as part of the "Russian World,” in other words
the Russian cultural and civilization space.20
The discussed tools used by Moscow are a priority for the functioning
of the unrecognized state and the position of its inhabitants on the
potential reintegration of Transnistria into the Republic of Moldova.
Financial support not only determines the survival of Transnistria in its
current form, but also strongly reinforces the public's reluctance to
consider reintegrating into Moldova in the future, as social standards
are significantly higher in Transnistria than in Moldova. Moldova, as
the poorest European country, does not appear to be an attractive
entity for the population of the parastatal state and therefore sees no
need for reintegration. Notably, if Tiraspol were to be completely
deprived of support from the Russian Federation, the parastatal state
will not be able to continue to exist without serious problems in the
economic sphere.
Since relations between Russia and Transnistria are asymmetrical (in
Russia's favor); Transnistria is not a fully independent entity in terms
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of creating political lines. With its economic instruments, Moscow is
largely creating Transnistrian political elites, as the support of Russian
decision-makers building the prosperity of the PMR is an important
factor for the electorate during the elections in the parastatal territory.
Therefore, the political forces of Transnistria are competing for support
from the Russian ally. It is worth remembering that the characteristic
feature of the PMR's party system is the strong pro-Russianism of all
parties (ideological homogeneity).
An example perfectly illustrating the influence of the Russian
Federation on the power structure of the parastatal state is the recent
presidential elections in 2016. The winner was Vadim Krasnosielski,
who in the past worked for the Sheriff holding company, the largest
company in Transnistria, which is part of the empire of post-Soviet
billionaires Victor Gushan and Ilya Kazmaly, who have companies in
Russia and Ukraine.21 Not without significance was Krasnoselsky’s
strong pro-Russian attitude, which in the perception of Transnistrian
society was to guarantee further cooperation with Moscow, extremely
important for the functioning of the parastatal state in its current
format, or the rapid implementation of the postulate to join
Transnistria to the Russian Federation.
Finally, the Russian Federation is involved in the negotiations on the
final settlement of the status of Transnistria. Moscow has repeatedly
supported the interests of Tiraspol during the talks. It is worth
mentioning that it was the Russian side that was the architect of the socalled the Kozak Memorandum (2003), which advocated the
federalization of Moldova as a solution to the Chisinau-Tiraspol
conflict, in other words strengthening the position of the region in the
structure of the Moldovan state, which would de facto mean
legitimizing its independence.22

Ideological foundations of Russian Foreign Policy
To interpret the short- and long-term strategic benefits of supporting
non-recognized states properly (in this case Transnistria) for Russia,
one should first consider the ideological foundations of Russian foreign
policy and its perception and position in international relations.
Undoubtedly, the political line created by Russian decision-makers fits
into a realistic concept of international relations, emphasizing the
priority of the national interest and the need to defend its values
against threats from the international environment, emphasizing the
7
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need to use hard power resources. It is worth recalling the words of
Hans Joachim Morgenthau, who pointed out that the main axis of
clashes between states is the struggle for political power understood as
the psychological relationship between those who hold power and those
who are subject to it.23 Only the maximization of power gives an
adequate level of security. Russian decision-makers display strong
geopolitical thinking. In addition, two currents of thought that have
had a huge impact on the process of forming a perception of Russia's
place in the global game for power: Isolationism and Eurasianism. The
representative of the first trend was Vadim Tsymburskiy, who in his
article entitled “The Island of Russia. The perspectives of Russian
geopolitics” (Rus. Ostrov Rossiya. Perspektivy rossiyskoy geopolitiki)
emphasized that in the space between the Atlantic and the Pacific there
are two civilizations next to each other: Russian and Western. Russia's
large territory and Russian hegemony over large areas in the past are
extremely important. The population living in the Russian Federation
has a different perception of the world than the representatives of the
western civilization.24 According to Tsymburskiy, the main concern of
the Russian center of power should be to prevent other entities from
interfering in the internal affairs of the state, while in terms of external
policy; the Russian influence should spread to the western and
southern border areas.
In the case of Eurasianism, the most famous representative of this
ideological trend today is Alexander Dugin. He postulates a rebirth of
Russia as Eurasia, a messianic empire that will balance the global
influences of Atlanticism. It is worth noting Dugin's 2009 publication
The Fourth Political Theory, which is still under discussion. The
geopolitician stressed the need to create a new ideology that would be
an adequate response to the security challenges of the 21st century. It is
to be an alternative to the hegemonic position of liberalism, in which he
sees the greatest threat to the Russian Federation and the whole world.
The starting point for his deliberations is the thesis that the three most
important political theories of the 20th century were communism,
fascism, and liberalism. Although the latter defeated fascism and
communism, Dugin sees the crisis of the “second wave of
democratization” and social discontent in various states, and therefore
proposes to mobilize international efforts to create a fourth theory, a
bridge between East and West.25
All the above trends influence the foreign policy of the Russian
Federation and the perception of its position in international relations.
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A characteristic feature of the created political line is the influence of
conservatism, which postulates the need for restitution of tradition,
Russian culture, and Orthodox values, as well as manifestation of
distinctness in relation to the West. Emphasizing Russian traditional
values such as hierarchy, a strong center of power (reference to the
tsarist self-leasing), a strong national identity and perception of Russia
as a great power is an extremely important component building the
identity of Russians. Due to its historical history, the Russian
Federation perceives its importance on the international arena in the
multi-layer categories, and thus the post-Soviet space states appear to
be a traditional sphere of influence. An effective tool for the
implementation of the postulate strengthens the identity of Russians
and the reintegration of the post-Soviet area as a supra-state
community is the already mentioned concept of the Russian World.26
The Russian administration has often stressed the defensive nature of
the political line, explaining all the aggressive actions that are
necessary to respond to the hostile actions of the West. Russia appears
in this view as a "besieged fortress,” in other words an entity that alone
resists the destructive forces of the Atlantic states, striving to weaken
its international position. For example, Moscow indicated that Western
support for colorful revolutions threatens Russian civilization and
minimize its impact in the traditional sphere of influence.27 This is an
unacceptable situation for a state whose foreign policy priority is to
restore its position as a power capable of transforming the world order.

Strategic Benefits for the Russian Federation Arising from
Support for Transnistria
The place of parastatal states in Russia's strategy should be considered
through the prism of such a political line. As Sergey Markedonov
rightly points out, the geopolitical rivalry-taking place between the
West (interpreted as a merger of the powers of the USA, the European
Union, and NATO) and the Russian Federation determines the political
and social situations of the parastatal states.28 By cooperating with the
unrecognized Transnistrian Republic of Moldova, Russia receives a
number of benefits for its positioning in international relations. The
existence of an entity within the Republic of Moldova, which reveals
separatist tendencies and is strongly linked to Russia, means that
Moldovan politicians must take into account Moscow's stance on the
country's activity in the international arena. The Kremlin's priority is to
keep Moldova in the orbit of Russian influence and to keep it in its
sphere of influence. Transnistria is a useful instrument for exerting
9
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pressure on Chisinau. Russia is sending a clear message – if Moldova
intensifies its efforts to participate in Euro-Atlantic structures (the
European Union and NATO), it will support (also militarily)
Transnistria's efforts to break away from Moldova, which will
destabilize the country's internal situation. Such a scenario carries the
risk of, for example, unfreezing the Moldovan-Transnistrian armed
conflict, which would pose a threat to security in the region.
The best example of preventing Moldova from becoming independent
of Russian influence is Moscow's reaction to the signing of an
association agreement between this country and the European Union
(27 June 2014). Shortly before this document was initialed by Moldova
(November 2013), the Rospotrebnadzor questioned the quality of
Moldovan wines by prohibiting its import to the Russian Federation,
which resulted in a 30 percent reduction in Moldovan wine exports in
2014. However, the sanctions described above did not apply to the
para-state and the pro-Russian region of Gagauzia, famous for its wine
production.29 On the other hand, after the signing of the association
agreement, Russian sanctions also included a restriction on fresh fruit
imports, as experts pointed out, due to a violation of laboratory control
of products, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned
that the signing of an agreement with the EU forces Russia to reexamine trade relations with Moldova.30 In addition, the Russian
administration has begun to influence Moldova's human capital
without extending the contracts to Moldovan workers.
In addition to these politically motivated sanctions, Moscow has begun
to create an opportunity to support the separatist tendencies of
Transnistria actively in the event that Moldova continues to maintain a
pro-Western political line and deepen its relations with EU and NATO
member states. Already in October 2014, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov stressed that if Moldova withdraws from the status of a
non-blocking state and participates in a political-military alliance, the
people of Transnistria will be fully entitled to decide on their future. In
the perception of the authorities in Tiraspol, the noticeable
strengthening of Chisinau's cooperation with NATO is a tool to put
pressure on Transnistria to abandon its independence and efforts to
integrate with Russia.31 Undoubtedly, by strengthening the
independence tendencies of paraphernalia, Russia is weakening
Moldova's potential for full integration with the EU, but also with
NATO. Moldova's neutrality status is enshrined in Article 11 of its
Constitution, but in the second decade of the 21st century, there is a
10
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clear strengthening of Chisinau's cooperation with NATO, which is
enshrined in the National Defense Strategy for 2018-2022, adopted by
the Moldovan authorities in 2018. The document envisages a
professionalization of Moldova's potential and an increase in funding
for the defense and security sector, as shown by the doubling of the
defense budget from 625 million MDL (2018) to 1.5 billion MDL
(2025). It is worth noting that the systematic increase in spending on
the development of the armed forces will pose a challenge to the
Moldovan budget.
There is no doubt that Chisinau will count on dynamic cooperation in
this area with Western structures such as NATO, which may be
interpreted by Moscow and Tiraspol as an aspiration to phase out the
status of a non-block state. This is justified because the content of the
strategy is not just a collection of provisions concerning the short and
long-term perspective of Moldova's security. The document has an
annex containing an action plan for the implementation of the new
defense strategy, with detailed guidelines for the planned steps, with a
specification of the institutions responsible, a time horizon and
estimated costs (budgetary and external financing). The annex provides
for, among other things, increasing the participation of Chisinau's
forces in international operations under the auspices of the UN to the
battalion within 6 months of the adoption of the strategy with the
support of technical and financial assistance projects from outside, or
further strengthening of partnership relations with NATO, including
the strengthening of defense capabilities.32
Further tightening of cooperation between NATO and Chisinau in the
future may result in Moscow using Tiraspol as a tool to prevent the
aforementioned cooperation and, at the same time, to keep Moldova in
the Russian sphere of influence. Russia will treat the approximation of
Alliance structures as a threat to national security and its privileged
position in the post-Soviet area.. The Russian Federation uses its
influence over the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic,
which in this context is an instrument of reactive policy of the Russian
Federation, in other words taking steps to counteract the weakening of
the hegemony's position in the post-Soviet space. Russia may inspire
the Transnistrian administration to reveal anti-Moldovan sentiments
among the people of the region, which will ultimately deepen the
country's internal destabilization. The lack of full control of the center
of power in Chisinau over the entire territory of the country is an
effective barrier to integration with Western political structures. Thus,
11
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the first important function of the Moscow-Tiraspol strategic
partnership is to prevent the Republic of Moldova from being included
in the Western sphere of influence (full participation in the European
Union and potential participation in NATO).
The Russian Federation tries to take all steps to protect its possessions
(integration of the post-Soviet area and hegemony status), which
strengthens its capacity to match the political resources of adversaries
from the western civilization. Transnistria not only strengthens
Russia's position in competition for membership in the Western or
Russian sphere of influence, but also weakens its independence and
freedom in creating its foreign policy lines. As the intensity of the
conflict increases in eastern Ukraine (2014- ), some researchers
pointed to the possibility of using the territory of Transnistria as a
starting point for convenient military operations in the Odessa region
due to its geographical location and the common TransnistrianUkrainian section of the border. Although these assumptions have not
worked, it is impossible not to agree that Transnistria is an important
component of the ongoing conflict. Many Transnistrian volunteers with
experience on the battlefield due to their participation in the
Moldovan-Transnistrian war are strengthening the separatist ranks of
Donetsk and Lugansk. As the prosecutor of Chisinau, Igor Popa,
stressed, the recruitment of Moldovan militants is increasing and
constitutes a clear threat to the state.33 In addition, Ukrainian
separatists are buying weapons and ammunition from the
aforementioned warehouse in Kolbasna. The stationing of Russian
armed forces in Transnistria is an instrument of psychological pressure
on Kiev. The alliance ties with the separatist Transnistria strengthen
pressure on Ukraine and constitute a potential source of danger for that
country.
Thanks to the benefits described above for the Russian Federation
resulting from supporting the statehood of Transnistria, it is
strengthening its position in the global competition for power with
adversaries, in other words the Euro-Atlantic states. The current lack of
prospects for reintegration of Moldova's territory distracts the country
from the goal of full participation in EU structures, and thus keeps it in
the Russian sphere of influence. Despite clear efforts of member states
to implement appropriate structural reforms in Moldova, which would
allow it to meet the Copenhagen Criteria or the active action of EU
representatives during the 5 plus 2 negotiations, Russia wins the
competition for Moldova's membership in a given sphere of influence
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(Russian or Western). Moscow using, among other things, the issue of
the unregulated status of Transnistria and the low effectiveness of
Moldova's political line towards paraphernalia due to the weakness of
Moldova's political elites and the lack of a coherent approach to this
problem.34 Cooperation with the parastatal states enables Russia to
lower the projections of Western powers in the post-Soviet area,
making them an effective tool for strengthening the implementation of
Russia's multi-layered aspirations.

Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the cooperation of the Russian Federation with the
parastatal state of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic implies
many advantages for Russia's position in international relations and at
the same time poses a challenge for regional security in the future.
Moscow supports the strengthening of the statehood of this entity on
many levels, including substantial financial support and the presence of
Russian armed forces on its territory. The assistance provided affects
the mood of the inhabitants of Transnistria, who are reluctant to
reintegrate the parastatal state into Moldova, thus fulfilling the goal of
Russia's political line of keeping Moldova in the Russian sphere of
influence. Due to the aspirations of Russian political decision-makers,
which have their roots in the history, political traditions, and culture of
the country, the priority assumption of the Russian Federation is to
maintain the position of a hegemon in the post-Soviet area, which is a
traditional area of Russian influence. Therefore, every effort goes to
limit the involvement of the West in this region, which is as a threat to
the strategic interests of the Russian Federation. Developing friendly
relations with paraphernalia is one of the instruments for reducing the
importance of Western civilization and weakening the aspirations of
post-Soviet states to participate in the EU and NATO. These treatments
are part of the geopolitical competition for power between Russia and
the West. In view of the benefits for the projection of Russia's power in
the region, it should be stated that close cooperation with parastatals,
including Transnistria, has a positive impact on the positioning of the
country in international relations and enables the implementation of
assumptions regarding the defense of the state of possession (the
position of hegemony in the post-Soviet area). Therefore, we can
confirm the research hypothesis. Initiated work on the article
prompted the author to conduct further research on the place of states
not recognized in Russian politics, including the accumulation of its
power. Undoubtedly, it is worth following events in parastatal states,
13
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such as Transnistria, for example, because of their significance for
regional and global security.
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